COMMENTS

PROTECTING LAWS DESIGNED TO REMEDY ANTI-GAY
DISCRIMINATION FROM EQUAL PROTECTION
CHALLENGES: THE DESIRABILITY OF RATIONAL
BASIS SCRUTINY

Erik K Ludwig
INTRODUCTION

The recent creation of a public school for gay students in New
York and the subsequent equal protection challenge filed on behalf
of non-gay students raises doubts about whether the conventional
wisdom held by many gay rights advocates-that gay people ought to
be recognized as a suspect class and thus subject to strict scrutinyremains a desirable goal today.
New York City's Harvey Milk High School' ("The Milk School")
was established in 1985 by the Hetrick-Martin Institute ("HMI"), a
grass-roots organization founded in 1979 to support gay,2 lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and questioning youth ("GLBTQ").' The Milk
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Harvey Milk was one of the first openly gay elected officials in the United States, and he
served on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors before being assassinated by former Board
member Dan White in 1978. For more information on the life of Harvey Milk, see RANDY
SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARvEY MILK (1982) (describ-

ing Milk's life and career in politics). See also MIKE WEISS, DOUBLE PLAY: THE SAN FRANCISCO
CITY HALL KILLINGS (1984) (examining the events surrounding the assassinations of Harvey
Milk and Mayor George Moscone in 1978).
Throughout this Comment, my use of the word "gay," when used in the absence of
the
terms "lesbian," "bisexual," "transgender," or "questioning," should be assumed to encompass
gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and questioning youth unless specifically noted otherwise.
My use of the word "gay" is not meant to belittle the meanings imputed upon names chosen by
people to describe their identities, but is used because it is the term most readily used and understood to describe this collective group.
Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk High School, F.A.Q's, http://
www.hmi.org/HOME/Article/Params/articles/ 131 1/pathlist/s1036_o1222/default.aspx#iteml
311 (last visitedJan. 25, 2005). Although the Institute describes itself as providing services to all
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School was founded in collaboration with the New York City Department of Education.4 The school targets students that are being harassed in their community schools because of their actual or perceived
sexual orientation or gender identity. The school was created "to of-

fer an alternative education program for youth that often find it difficult or impossible to attend their home schools due to continuous
threats and experiences of physical violence and verbal harassment. ' 6
Today, the City's Education Department oversees school administration and admissions,' making it the only public school of its kind
in the country." In 2002, the Board of Education authorized a $3.2
million expansion to triple the size of the student body (to 170 students) and increase the physical size of the school.9 Some of the
funds allocated to the expansion came from federal formula grant

at-risk youth, it is particularly aimed at "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and questioning
('GLBTQ') youth." Id. The mission of HMI reads:
The Hetrick-Martin Institute (HMI), Home of The Harvey Milk High Schoo4 believes all
young people, regardless of sexual orientation or identity, deserve a safe and supportive
environment in which to achieve their full potential. HMI creates this environment for
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and questioning youth between the ages of 12 and 21
and their families. Through a comprehensive package of direct services and referrals,
HMI seeks to foster healthy youth development. HMI's staff promotes excellence in the
delivery of youth services and uses its expertise to create innovative programs that other
organizations may use as models.
ld.
4 See id. (describing the Education Department's involvement in
the school).
5 "Real" sexual orientation refers to those who actually identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual,
or

transgender. "Perceived" sexual orientation refers to those youth who are perceived by their
peers, especially by their harassers, to be gay. These students may not actually be gay. Absent
from the dialogue about this school is that the people at issue are teenagers who may not yet be
fully aware of their sexuality. Therefore, the Milk School is potentially composed of both gay
and non-gay students, even if the non-gay students currently identify as gay. SeeJohn Colapinto,
The Harvey Milk School Has No Right to Exist. Discuss, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 7, 2005, at 38, available at
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/features/10970 ("Of the 100 students attending the school this year, there is apparently only one whom any of the students identify as
straight.").
6 Id. The New York City Department of Education describes the school's mission
without
any mention of the school's focus on LGBTQ youth, but rather describes the school as "creating
a safe educational environment for all young people.... who have not felt successful in at least
one other high school ...and who want to continue their education in an alternative, small
school environment."
NYC Department of Education, Harvey Milk High School,
http://www.nycenet.edu/OurSchools/Region9/M586/default.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
For differing positions on the need for the Harvey Milk School, compare Rebecca Bethard, New
York's Harvey Milk School: A Viable Alternative, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 417, 422 (2004) (arguing that the
Milk School is necessary in order to protect gay at-risk youth) with Richard Thompson Ford,
Brown's Ghost, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1305, 1307 (2004) (asserting that although the Milk School
seeks to advance important goals, it does so at the cost of further segregating schools).
7 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, F.A.Q's, supra
note 3.
8 See Colapinto, supra note 5, at 34 (referring to the Milk School as "the nation's first public
school for gay and lesbian youth").
9 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, F.A.Q's, supra
note 3.

May 2006]

REMEDYING ANTI-GA YDISCRIM1NA TION

funds received under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program, as
provided for by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002.0
Although the school is technically open to students regardless of
their sexuality, the common element among the student body appears to be that the students attending the Milk School have been
harassed in their traditional schools because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. This composition is implied in both the
school's history and the City's discourse about the school."
Students attending the Milk School enjoy a higher graduation
rate, and a greater number seek higher education than the City's
public schools as a whole. The Milk School reports a ninety-five percent graduation rate, 2 compared to all New York City Schools to0
gether, which graduate only fifty-eight percent of their students.
Sixty percent of Milk School students attend college or other additional educational programs following graduation. 4 The Milk School
spends nearly $32,000 per student, 5 nearly three0 times more than the
approximately $11,000 spent per pupil citywide.'
Shortly after the Department of Education announced the expanded public funding of the Milk School in 2002, New York State
Senator Ruben Diaz, Sr. and a group of parents filed suit challenging
the use of public funds for the Milk School. 7 Among the lawsuit's
claims is that the school violates the constitutional rights of heterosexual students under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
'0

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 7102 (West 2002)

(pledging "to support programs that prevent violence in and around schools"). See Bethard,
supra note 6, at 420 (describing how the No Child Left Behind Act "provides freedom for administrators to use federal funds to explore new methods of education").
1 The school itself was established for the purpose of assisting gay at-risk youth and the organization that founded the school, the Hetrick-Martin Institute, is committed to supporting
gay youth. See supranote 3 and accompanying text (describing the history of the school, and its
focus on gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender students).
1 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, F.A.Q's, supra note 3.
13 See Attrition of Students from New York Schools: Hearing Before the
N. Y. S. Standing Comm. on
Educ., 226th Legis. Sess. (2003) (statement of Walter M. Haney, Center for the Study of
Testing, Evaluation and Educational Policy, Boston College), available at http://
www.timeoutfromtesting.org/testimonies/923_TestimonyHaney.pdf (reporting New York City
high school graduation rates in 2001-2002).
14 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School,
F.A.Q's, supra note 3.
15 See Colapinto, supra note 5, at 37 (explaining that the school
received $3.2 million last
year).
16 See Joe Williams & Kathleen Lucadamo, State No. 2 in School Spending, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 4, 2004, at 18, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/local/story/
258710p-221602c.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2005) ("Right now, the city spends about $11,000 per
pupil.").
17 Diaz v. Bloomberg, No. 114533 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 13, 2003), noted
in Bethard, supra
note 6, at 420. The Liberty Counsel and Norman Siegel, former executive director of the New
York Civil Liberties Union, also support Diaz's lawsuit. See David M. Herszenhorn, Lawsuit Opposes Expansion of School for Gay Students, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at A12 (describing State
Senator Diaz's lawsuit).
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Amendment."' Despite the fact that approximately eighty percent of
the Milk School's students are black and Hispanic,' 9 Senator Diaz believes that black and Hispanic youth attending low-performing
schools are victims of discrimination because the Milk School has a
larger budget per pupil, smaller classes, as well as higher graduation
rates and rates of students pursuing higher education. 20 Diaz argues
that the funds "should be better used to protect all children-black,
Jewish, Hispanic, Asian, Arabs-all children., 2' Additionally, students
who are victims of non-sexually oriented harassment, Diaz argues, do
not have a similar alternative school.
The prospect of claims raised by heterosexuals challenging the
constitutionality of state-sponsored programs that seek to remedy
anti-gay discrimination, such as the Milk School, raise important
questions about the likelihood that such benign measures will survive
judicial review. For decades, conventional wisdom among gay rights
advocates was that gay people were a suspect class and discriminatory
legislation directed at them should receive a heightened level ofjudicial scrutiny. Attorneys and gay legal interest groups, 23 as well as legal
18 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;... nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see Herszenhorn, supra note 17, at A12
("[T]he Harvey Milk school was set aside for too broad a class of people, violating heterosexual
students' right to equal protection." (quoting Norman Siegel, former Executive Director of the
New York Civil Liberties Union)); see also Bethard, supra note 6, at 420 (stating that the lawsuit
also claims that the school violates the Education Department's anti-discrimination principles
and is a waste of tax money).
19See Colapinto, supra note 5, at 37 (noting that "the vast majority of Harvey
Milk's students-some 80 percent-are blacks and Latinos").
20 See Bethard, supra note 6, at 420 ("Senator Diaz has stated
he is opposed to segregation
and that the funds used for the Harvey Milk School would be better spent on programs to protect all students."). Bethard suggests that Diaz perceives a school for gay students as somehow
excluding black or Hispanic students. He appears to overlook the fact that the student body of
the Milk School includes GLBTQ students who are black or Hispanic.
21 Herszenhorn, supra note 17, at A12 (quoting State Senator
Diaz) (internal quotations
omitted).
See Bethard, supra note 6, at 420 (stating that Diaz's suit alleges discrimination against
heterosexual students). The case, which was filed in New York State Supreme Court in 2003,
has not advanced since it was initiated. There is a chance that the case will be settled. The Liberty Counsel, representing the plaintiffs in the lawsuit, is allegedly in negotiations with the City.
Some of the changes being sought include removal of language describing the school as a haven for LGBTQ students, as well as changes in how information is provided to guidance counselors referring students to the school. See Colapinto, supranote 5, at 39 ("It's hard to deny the
validity of Senator Diaz's claim that the luxurious expansion and renovation of the Harvey Milk
High School represents an inequitable distribution of city funds.").
See, e.g.,
Brief for the Petitioners at 32 n.24, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No.
02-102) ("Heightened equal protection scrutiny is appropriate for laws like Section 21.06 that
use a sexual-orientation-based classification."); Brief for Anti-Defamation League et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 93-1039) ("[W]e
submit that any such attempt to close both political and judicial fora to claims of unconstitutional discrimination by a particular social group rendersthat group a suspect class. Amendment
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scholars,24 argued that suspect status would make it far more difficult
for states and local governments to pass laws for the purpose of denying gay people those rights afforded to non-gay people.
If challenges to discriminatory measures were considered under heightened
review rather than under traditional rational basis, the reasoning
went, the Court would have greater leeway to reverse anti-gay measures.
This strategy to win suspect status for gay people was likely due in
large part to the fact that so much of the legislation being passed by
state and local governments prior to the 1990s included programs
that explicitly discriminated against gay people or were aimed at further weakening any recognition of rights that gay people had previously achieved. Today, however, when many of the laws and programs that classify based on sexual orientation seek to remedy anti-gay
discrimination, a reexamination is appropriate: Is heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation-based legislation still a desirable strategy
for gay rights advocates?
Using the Milk School as an example, this Comment argues that
rational basis review may better serve the goals of gay rights advocates
2 thus requires strict judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause."); Brief of Human Rights Campaign Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 4-9, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) (arguing that strict scrutiny should
be applied to equal protection challenges involving sexual orientation classifications).
24 See, e.g.,
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond CaroleneProducts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 730-31 (1985)
(reasoning that the meaning given to "discrete and insular minorities" is inadequate to protect
groups such as homosexuals from prejudice); Jennifer Wriggins, Maine's "Act to Protect Traditional Marriageand Prohibit Same-Sex Marriages" Questions of Constitutionality Under State and Federal Law, 50 ME. L. REV. 345, 353-54 (1998) (contending that same-sex marriage is a genderbased classification that should be subject to heightened scrutiny); see also Seth Hilton, Comment, Restraints on Homosexual Rights Legislation: Is There a FundamentalRight to Participatein the
Political Process, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 449 (1995) (arguing for heightened scrutiny for gays
under the Equal Protection Clause); Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Application of
Equal ProtectionHeightened Scrutiny to ClassificationsBased on Homosexuality, 57 S.CAL. L. REV. 797,
797-98 (1984) (arguing for suspect classification of homosexuality under the Equal Protection
Clause); John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Callfor HeightenedJudicialScrutiny, 41
UCLA L. REV. 153, 158 (1993) (advocating for heightened scrutiny for anti-gay ballot measures); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should
Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73
FORDMi
4 q L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005) ("[A]n acknowledgment by the Court of its use of a more
searching form of rational basis review-a type of heightened scrutiny-for sexual orientation
classifications as used in Romer and Lawrence will resolve the two unintended consequences of
those cases."); Mark Tanney, Note, The Defense of MarriageAct: A "BareDesire to Harm" an Unpopular Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Governmental Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 99,
129 (1997) ("There is a strong argument that gays and lesbians belong to such a 'suspect class.'
This designation would be helpful to proponents of gay rights because laws that discriminate
against gays would be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."); Note, The Constitutional Status of
Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1297-99
(1985) (arguing for suspect classification of homosexuality under the Equal Protection Clause).
25 See supra notes 23-24 (citing examples of arguments in support of
suspect status for gay
people).
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than would application of heightened scrutiny.5 Twenty years ago, in
Bowers v. Hardwick,7 the Supreme Court upheld the criminalization of
same-sex sodomy under rational basis review. Today, however, although some anti-gay legislation-especially related to gay marriage-remains, many states and municipalities are passing measures
granting civil rights protections to gay people in other areas. Because
there is a presumption of constitutionality when the Court reviews
state regulations of non-suspect groups, benign legislation is likely to
withstand rational basis scrutiny so long as there is a legitimate state
interest for its passage-such as remedying discrimination against gay
people.
Through an examination of the Milk School as a type of benign
state-sponsored program meant to remedy discrimination faced by
gay students, I analyze why such a state-sponsored program would
withstand rational basis scrutiny-even one in which non-gay students
were explicitly excluded from admittance. In contrast, because of the
Court's application of heightened scrutiny to benign programs meant
to remedy discrimination against existing suspect classes, remedial
programs like the Milk School would most likely fail under strict scrutiny.
Although anti-gay measures are more likely to be struck down under strict scrutiny, the Court has substantially cut back on what qualifies as a legitimate state interest since the rational basis standard was
described in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc2 8 The Court's
rejection of private prejudice and moral disapproval as legitimate
state interests in Romer v. Evans2 and Lawrence v. Texa? suggest that
very few pieces of legislation excluding gay people from legal protections should withstand rational basis review because states will so
rarely have more than moral disapproval on which to base an interest. Therefore, the need for suspect class status is less necessary today
than it was prior to these decisions.
The time when suspect status was most desirable may have passed.
The movement for equal rights for gay people is at a crossroads today, and because so much benign legislation is coming out of state
and local governments, the maintenance of these advances may outweigh the benefits that suspect status would provide.
This Comment does not suggest that either the author or gay rights advocates as a whole
believe a school limited to gay youth is a good program or a solution to harassment of gay
youth. The constitutionality of a school like the Milk School is used as a case example throughout this Comment to illustrate that even a drastic measure such as a segregated school will likely
survive rational basis scrutiny.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
28 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
29 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
30 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Part I considers the historical purposes and traditional meanings
of the tiers of scrutiny and the application of rational basis scrutiny to
sexual orientation-related legislation under Romer and Lawrence. Decades before these decisions, the Court began to apply a less deferential form of rational basis review, at least in the context of laws that
classified according to identity groups. Cutting back on what qualified as a legitimate interest, the Court suggested that the prejudicial
desire to harm an unpopular group is an insufficient basis for withstanding rational basis review.31 Romer and Lawrence both applied and
further adapted this less deferential rational basis review to laws burdening gay people. 2 Although these decisions did not recognize gay
people as a suspect class, the opinions suggest that private prejudice
and moral disapproval of gay people are insufficient grounds for upholding laws burdening the group.
If Lawrence's rational basis analysis, read in conjunction with Romer, is interpreted to apply to all laws classifying on the basis of sexual
orientation, such measures should subsequently fail as they are almost always based on moral disapproval. Thus, strict scrutiny becomes less necessary as a barrier to the harm of discriminatory legislation. Part II explores this idea and recognizes that although the
decisions left questions unanswered about how broadly or narrowly
the opinions should be read-allowing lower and state courts to construe the holdings differently-the holdings unquestionably make it
more difficult for anti-gay measures to survive rational basis review
today.
Part III argues that because gay people are still subject to rational
basis review (even if the Court appears to be applying a somewhat
heightened form), benign legislation meant to remedy anti-gay discrimination will almost certainly withstand constitutional scrutiny
with little intervention by the Court. The Milk School-or even a
school that explicitly excludes non-gay students-would survive the
Court's current judicial scrutiny of gay-related programs.
However, because the Court applies heightened scrutiny not only
to discriminatory measures with malicious intent, but also to programs meant to remedy discrimination faced by suspect classes, Part
IV suggests that remedial programs like the Milk School would not
likely withstand constitutional muster under a heightened level of judicial review.

31 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("[A] bare congressional

desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.").
32 See infra Part I.B (discussing how the Court applied
rational basis review to statutes classifying on the basis of sexual orientation or behavior).
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Although an argument may still be made in favor of suspect status
for gay people, the competing arguments against such status reflect
the very turning point in the gay rights movement that makes suspect
status less desirable. Because so many benign measures to protect gay
people from discrimination or remedy past discrimination are being
passed today, even though suspect status would still be optimal in
some instances of malicious discrimination, Part V suggests that the
goal of maintaining gay rights advances may outweigh the risk that
anti-gay measures will be affirmed under rational basis review.
Nearly all benign legislation should survive post-Lawrence rational
basis review while most anti-gay measures should fail. Thus, limited
intervention into state and local sexual orientation-related legislation
appears more desirable than strict scrutiny of state-sponsored programs.
I. THE APPLICATION OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW TO SEXUAL
ORIENTATION-BASED LAWS

Despite the fact that rational basis review of legislation is notoriously lenient and pretextual rationales are routinely accepted in the
economic context, the Court's application of rational basis scrutiny to
statutes classifying on the basis of identity groups has proven less deferential. Decades before the decisions in Romer v. Evans33 and Lawrence v. Texas,5 4 the Court found that the prejudicial desire to harm a
politically unpopular group was not a sufficient basis to withstand rational basis review.

More recently, in Romer and Lawrence, the Court applied this less
deferential approach and further cut back on what qualifies as a legitimate state interest in the context of statutes classifying on the basis
of sexual orientation and sexual conduct. The Court's holdings in
Romer and Lawrence suggest that anti-gay sentiment and moral disapproval of gay people provide an insufficient justification for finding
legislation constitutional under rational basis review.36

3

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

34 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
35 See infra text accompanying notes 48-51 (explaining court holdings
finding the bare desire to harm to be an insufficient state interest).
36 While the Court's decisions in Romer and Lawrence have led many
to argue that the Court

is applying a heightened form of rational basis review to statutes classifying on the basis of sexual orientation, the Court has not recognized a fundamental right to same-sex conduct, nor has
it recognized gay people as a suspect class. See infra Part I.B (explaining the holdings and arguments that the scrutiny being applied is something more than rational basis review).
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A. The Evolution of Rational Basis Review Before Romer and Lawrence
1. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.
Distancing itself from the Lochner-era Court which routinely used
the Fourteenth Amendment to overturn state legislation, the Court
in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. announced that "[t]he
day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident,
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought., 38 Under rational basis review, laws would be "presumed to be valid and [would]
by the statute is rationally rebe sustained if the classification drawn
9
lated to a legitimate state interest.0
In Lee Optical, the Court laid out its notoriously lenient and highly
deferential rational basis standard.4 ° It explained that the use of legislative classifications and corresponding reforms "need not be in every
respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might
be thought that
the particular legislative measure was a rational way
41
to correct it."
The Court in Lee Optical considered the constitutionality of a state
law that prohibited opticians from fitting lenses without an ophthalmologist's or optometrist's prescription, among other restrictions. 2
Finding that such a regulation did not violate either the Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses, the Court said that even where the
Court itself may believe such regulations to be unnecessary, it was not
the Court's role, but the legislature's, to weigh the "advantages and
43
Because eye glass frames are
disadvantages" of such regulations.
used to treat a health issue relating to the eye and a state may wish to
strictly professionalize eye-care treatment, the Court found that it
could not "say that the regulation ha[d] no rational relation to that
The
objective and therefore is beyond constitutional bounds.""
Court further explained that because "[e]vils in the same field may
37 During the so-called Lochner era in the Court's jurisprudence,
from 1905 until the midtwentieth century, the Court overruled hundreds of state statutes by applying the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the
Unshacklingof the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 493 (1997) (describing the Lochner-erajurisprudence and the Court's application of substantive due process).
38 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 488 (1955).
39 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Clebure Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 440 (1985).
40 Lee Optical,348 U.S. at 487-88.

41 Id.
:2
3

44

Id. at 489-91.

Id. at 487.
Id. at 491.
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be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring [or believed by
the legislature to require] different remedies, 45 a state legislature
could remedy these evils "one step at a time" or regulate one area of a
profession while "neglecting the others." 46
7

2. The "Bare... Desire to Harm'A
While the standard adopted in Lee Opticalsuggested that even pretextual rationales would be routinely accepted in economic rational
basis cases, in cases where the regulations at issue discriminate on the
basis of an identity group, the Court has sometimes applied a more
searching and less deferential standard than that set out in Lee Optical. In the context of identity groups, the Court has explained that
rational basis scrutiny does not leave a group "entirely unprotected
from invidious discrimination" where laws are put in place solely to
harm or single out an unpopular or stigmatized group.
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,49 the Court explained that an objective to harm a politically unpopular group is not
a legitimate interest for purposes of rational basis review. In Moreno,
the Court held that legislation preventing households with unrelated
members from receiving food stamps did not pass constitutional muster because the purpose of the law was to prevent "hippies" from receiving these benefits.5'
More recently, in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,52
the Court held that there was no rational basis for the government's
requirement that a home for the mentally handicapped have a spe53
cial use permit since other group homes had no such requirement.
The Court explained that the rational basis standard allows local governments the necessary freedom "to pursue policies designed to assist
the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. "0 4 However, the city could not "rely on a
45 Id. at 489.
46

Id.

47 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 447 (1985).
48 Id. at 446.
49 413 U.S. 528 (1973).

50 See id. at 534 ("[A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454

(1972) (holding that a Massachusetts law providing dissimilar treatment of married and unmarried persons with regards to the right to access contraception violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
51 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
52473 U.S. 432 (1985).
53Id. at 447-48.
54Id. at 446.
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classification whose relationship to an asserted goal [was] so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. 55
The Court rejected the City Council's arguments that the special
permit was legitimate because of concerns that local property owners
had "negative attitudes" and fears about the presence of this type of
home in their neighborhood and near a school.56 It explained that
the arguments rested "on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded;, 57 the permit requirement was unconstitutional because
"the law cannot, directly or indirectly," give effect to private prejudices. 5s
The City Council also claimed that the special permit was necessary to protect the residents in the home since it was situated in a
flood plain and its mentally retarded residents might not know how
to survive a flood. 59 Further, the City Council claimed that the large
size of the home justified the special permit requirement.60 The
Court responded that since patients in a nursing home would face
the same dangers in the event of a flood and because the size of the
home was no different than the size of fraternity houses and other
group houses in the neighborhood, restrictions requiring a special
permit only for this particular home were not rationally related to the
alleged purpose. 6' The law was motivated by the "bare ...desire to
harm a politically unpopular group"62 and therefore violated the
Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's decisions in Moreno and Cleburne suggest that in cases
in which the state classifies on the basis of identity groups, courts will
examine the interests claimed by the state more closely and with less
deference than they would in economic rational basis cases. 4 Furthermore, these holdings suggest that pretextual reasons are an insufficient basis upon which to assert a measure's constitutionality where
the underlying motive of the classification is prejudice or a desire to
harm the group.

Id.
Id.at 448.
57Id. at 450.
58 Id. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)) (internal
quotations omitted).
59 Id. at
449.
55
56

° Id.

61 Id.at 450.
62

Id. at 447 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal

quotations omitted).

Id. at 435.
Marshall noted that while the majority in Cleburne claimed to apply rational basis
review to find the ordinance invalid, the "ordinance surely would be valid under the traditional
rational-basis test applicable to economic and commercial regulation." Id. at 456 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
63

64Justice
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B. RationalBasis UnderRomer and Lawrence
The Court's recent decisions in Romer and Lawrence further narrow the definition of a legitimate interest for a measure classifying on
the basis of sexual orientation or conduct, without holding that gay
people constitute a suspect class or that same-sex sexual conduct is a
fundamental right.
Striking down Colorado's Constitutional
Amendment 2, which prohibited the passage or enforcement of laws
entitling gay people to protected or minority status or preferential
treatment, the Court in Romer applied a form of rational basis scrutiny
similar to that applied in non-commercial equal protection cases like
Moreno and Cleburne. The bare desire to harm a single group-in this
case, gay people-is not a legitimate interest to uphold a regulation
discriminating against a class. More recently, both the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence held that moral
disapproval alone is not a legitimate state interest for the purpose of
upholding laws burdening gay people or same-sex sexual conduct.65
1. Romer v. Evans
In Romer, the Court held that Colorado's Amendment 2, which
prohibited any state or local government bodies or agencies from
making or enforcing laws or policies entitling gay people to claim
"minority status, quota preferences, [or] protected status or [to assert] claim[s] of discrimination," 66 violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 61 Passage of the Amendment by voters meant that laws previously enacted in cities like Denver and
Boulder, which prohibited discrimination in areas such as housing
and employment on the basis of sexual orientation, were void and
unconstitutional. The major problem with Amendment 2, according to the Romer majority, was that by state decree, homosexuals "are
65 See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the rejection of moral disapproval as a legitimate
state interest in the Lawrence opinion andJustice O'Connor's concurrence).
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, reprinted in COLO. REV. STAT. § 30(b) (2004).
The Amendment read:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id.
I67
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
68 See id. at 623-24. As Justice Kennedy stated, Amendment 2 not only repealed such
laws,
but also "prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive orjudicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect" homosexuals, bisexuals, and lesbians. Id. at 624.
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put in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in
both the private and governmental spheres. The amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection
from the injuries caused by discrimination,
and it forbids reinstate69
ment of these laws and policies.,

Recognizing the potential for injury to be inflicted upon gay people as a group, Justice Kennedy wrote that discrimination based on an
irrelevant characteristic places "a special disability" on gay people
alone." "Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections
from the law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be
claimed for it."71 The amendment prevented gay people from accessing protections which are part of ordinary civic life and are often
taken for granted by those who are already protected or who do not
need them.2
Echoing earlier court analysis of rational basis review in the context of politically unpopular groups, Justice Kennedy explained that
"[b]y requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship to
an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law., 73 Justice Kennedy reasoned:

[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected. "[I]f the constitutional conception of
'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare.., desire to harm a politically unpopular74 group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.

The Court concluded that Amendment 2 was inspired by animus and
that any animus-based justification for a law fails rational basis review.75
69 Id. at 627.

70 Id. at 631.
71 Id. at 635.

72 Id. at 631. As Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. argues, the Romer opinion marked
the
Court's rejection of the notion that anti-discrimination laws based upon sexual orientation conferred "special rights." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudenceof Tolerance: Judicial
Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1021, 1038 (2004). Instead, the
Court articulated the protections at issue as "'normal' protections everyone else either takes for
granted or enjoys." Id.
73Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
74 Id. at 634 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
75 Id. Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer is largely irrelevant today because he relied on Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in arguing that if homosexual conduct can be permissibly
criminalized, then a state may enact laws disfavoring the people who engage in this conduct.
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2. Lawrence v. Texas
a. Majority Opinion
• 7"6

Rejecting the Court's holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the
majority held that homosexuals could be denied the right to engage
in forms of sexual conduct, Lawrence went further than Romer by suggesting that moral disapproval is insufficient grounds to withstand rational basis scrutiny, at least in the context of sexual conduct. The
Court held that criminalizing intimate sexual behavior is a violation
of gay people's due process right to liberty. 77 QuotingJustice Stevens'
dissent in Bowers, in which he argued that "the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice, 78 the Court held that Stevens' analysis "should have been
controlling in Bowers and should control here."79

Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Bowers was explicitly overruled by the Court in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
76 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In overruling Bowers, Justice Kennedy wrote that the majority
"misapprehended the claim of liberty" presented by the case, characterizing the question simply as
"whether there is a fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy" rather than whether
the state may regulate "the most private human conduct." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Justice Kennedy wrote that the case "involve [d] two adults who,
with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives." Id. The holding
relied heavily on the due process personal liberty and privacy interests explicated by the Court
in cases such as PlannedParenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), in
which the Court reaffirmed due process rights to make personal decisions regarding issues such
as marriage, use of contraception, family relationships, and education. The Court also relied
heavily on the holdings of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), which held that a law banning distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people was invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause, and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which defined a right to privacy within
the marital sphere.
78 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting))
(internal 4 uotations omitted).
Id. at 578. Although the Court never explicitly stated that it was applying rational basis
review, the Court also did not announce same-sex sodomy as a fundamental right. See id. ("The
Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."). Lawrence's rejection of moral disapproval as a legitimate interest, however, has led many to argue that the Court applied a heightened degree of
scrutiny without saying so. Justice Scalia argued that "enforcement of traditional notions of
sexual morality" has always been a sufficient basis for surviving rational basis scrutiny and that
the Court's holding to the contrary signaled the Court's application of something more than
rational basis review. Id. at 601 (Scalia,J., dissenting). Professor Laurence H. Tribe noted that
the Lawrence majority's reliance on cases which affirmed fundamental liberty interests, such as
the right to use contraception or make decisions regarding child-bearing, was evidence of its
application of a heightened form of scrutiny. Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The
"FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1893, 1917 (2004). After
Lawrence, Martin A. Schwartz argued that the "state interest in promoting morality is not a legitimate governmental interest and that the state does not have a legitimate governmental in-
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Although the Lawrence decision can be interpreted as applying
simply to criminal sexual conduct, Justice Kennedy suggested that the
conduct at issue was inextricably linked to the identity of gay people.
Justice Kennedy wrote that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression
in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring."80 The holding
can therefore be read as extending the reach of "moral disapproval"
as an illegitimate reason to all classifications made on the basis of
sexual orientation or identity. Justice Kennedy wrote:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be
said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure,
statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular
sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more farreaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that,
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished
as criminals."'
The case served as an opportunity to say that the liberty interest at
stake-the right of consenting adults to engage in sodomy within the
confines of their homes-went beyond the issue of privacy, and had
implications for gay people in the public realm, as well. 82 The decision, Professor Tribe argued, went "out of its way to equate the insult
of reducing a same-sex intimate relationship to the sex acts committed within that relationship with the insult of reducing a marriage to
heterosexual intercourse."

By equating sexual conduct with sexual identity, Justice Kennedy
appears to suggest that "moral disapproval" would not constitute a legitimate purpose under an equal protection challenge despite the
fact that the holding was decided on due process grounds. He wrote
that if "protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so
remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection

terest in harming a politically unpopular group." Martin A. Schwartz, Lawrence v. Texas: The
Decision and Its Implicationsfor the Future,20 TOURO L. REV. 221, 230 (2004).
80 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 Justice Kennedy stated that "[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of
the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres." Id. at 575.
83 Tribe, supra note 79, at 1948.
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reasons. " 84 Although he believed that Lawrence had made a "tenable" equal protection argument, Justice Kennedy wrote that to hold
the Texas statute invalid on Equal Protection grounds could raise the
possibility that a similar statute, drawn so as to prohibit certain conduct regardless of sex, would be valid.8
b. Justice O'Connor'sConcurrence
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, found the Texas
sodomy statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Justice
O'Connor reasoned that the statute made gay people "unequal in the
eyes of the law by making particular conduct-and only that conduct-subject to criminal sanction." 86 Like the majority, she found
that moral disapproval is not a legitimate reason to withstand rational
basis. She also equated sexual conduct with sexual identity, suggesting that moral disapproval is not a legitimate state interest for purposes of classifying on the basis of sexual orientation or conduct.
Citing Romer, Justice O'Connor found moral disapproval to fall
within the meaning of the Romer court's rejection of the desire to
harm an unpopular group as sufficient to survive rational basis analysis under the Equal Protection Clause. She argued that there was no
rational basis to deny one group, gay people, the right to engage in
same-sex sexual relations. Justice O'Connor asserted that moral disapproval of a group, "like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
Citing Romer, Justice O'Connor stated
Equal Protection Clause."
that equal protection disallows states from creating classifications for
its own sake or for the sake of disadvantaging the burdened group.89
Therefore, "a more searching form of rational basis review" is warranted in these cases.90
Just as the majority recognized that the constitutionality of the
statute went beyond a question of homosexual conduct, Justice
O'Connor rejected the notion that the law was about conduct and
found that the Texas sodomy law was "directed towards gay persons as
a class." 9' Because same-sex sodomy was criminal under Texas law,
homosexuals were branded as criminals, which resulted in discrimination against the class of homosexuals in areas outside criminal

85

87

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
Id. at 574-75.
Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 582 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996)).

88

Id.

89

Id. at 583 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
Id. at 580.
Id. at 583.

90

91
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Such criminalization, Justice O'Connor argued, stigmatized

homosexuals and was therefore unconstitutional. 3
After Romer and Lawrence, it appears that moral disapproval alone
is an insufficient basis for upholding state programs that classify on
the basis of sexual orientation or sexual conduct.

II. MOST DISCRIMINATORY LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT SURVIVE UNDER
ROMER AND LAWRENCE'S READING OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Because the Court has significantly restricted the definition of a
legitimate interest since Lee Optical, today, in the aftermath of Romer
and Lawrence, laws discriminating against gay people should rarely
survive rational basis review. Sexual orientation is seldom relevant to
one's ability to contribute to society, so the state will almost never
have anything other than moral disapproval or prejudice to hang its
hat on in arguing for a law burdening gay people. However, not all
anti-gay legislation will fail judicial scrutiny after Lawrence. Both the
majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence
emphasized that the Court's decision did not extend to same-sex
marriage.9 4 Moreover, because the Court did not recognize same-sex
conduct as a fundamental right or find gay people to be a suspect
class, some courts have applied the decision very narrowly.9 5 Undoubtedly, though, the Court's rulings in Romer and Lawrence have
made it more difficult for anti-gay legislation to withstand rational basis review. They have allowed courts to strike down anti-gay legislation and affirm gay civil rights under rational basis in ways that courts
previously would not have been able to do.9 6
A. MoralDisapprovaland DiscriminatoryLegislation
Although the holding in Lawrence specifically considered the constitutionality of "criminal" gay sexual conduct, the decision went further by suggesting that when a state criminalizes the activities of "homosexual persons" as undesirable or immoral, it invites unlawful
discrimination and stigmatization of gay people "in the public and in

Id. at 583-84. Justice O'Connor appears to suggest that the criminalization of gays sanctions other forms of discrimination and stigmatizes them as people who, as a result of their sexual identity, are, in a sense, illegal beings. Id.
93 Id.
94 See infra Part II.B.1 (describing the disclaimers made by Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor
with respect to gay marriage).
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing several lower and state court decisions reading the Lawrence
holding narrowly).
See infra Part II.A (discussing several lower and state court decisions reading the Lawrence
decision broadly).
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the private spheres." 97 Because "the law cannot, directly or indirectly," give effect to private prejudices,98 the opinion can be interpreted as saying that-despite deciding the case on due process
grounds in the context of sexual conduct-laws meant to stigmatize
gay people as a group that are motivated by "moral disapproval" should
also be found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.99 Similarly, Justice O'Connor echoed Justice Kennedy's sentiment in finding Texas's anti-sodomy law unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds in her concurring opinion. She wrote that "[m] oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause. 100
In his harsh dissent, Justice Scalia correctly predicted that, after
Lawrence, it would be difficult for any law burdening gay people to
survive judicial scrutiny.
He wrote, with reference to Justice
O'Connor's concurrence:
If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state interest" for purposes of proscribing that conduct, and if, as the Court
coos... "when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with

another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring," what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising "the
liberty protected by the Constitution"? Surely not the encouragement of
procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.10'

Scalia also criticized the equal protection argument made by Justice
O'Connor in her concurrence-that Lawrence does not prevent a
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575. In full,Justice Kennedy wrote:
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the
public and in the private spheres. The central holding of Bowers has been brought in
question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans
the lives of homosexual persons.
97

Id.

City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1984) (quoting Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
99 Romer is also instructive in explaining why measures discriminating
against gay people
should fail under rational basis review after Lawrence. By singling out gay people for discrimination, Colorado's Amendment 2 inflicted on gay people "immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). Because sexual conduct is the primary basis used to distinguish
homosexuals from heterosexuals and because regulations of this conduct are irrationally based
on moral disapproval, it is difficult to see how regulations discriminating against gay people
could be rationalized.
to Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The sodomy law, she argued,
was
not simply targeted at sexual conduct, but "toward gay persons as a class. 'After all, there can
hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines
the class criminal.'" Id. at 583 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia,J., dissenting)).
101Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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state from restricting same-sex marriage if its purpose is to preserve
marriage as an institution. Justice Scalia responded that "preserving
the traditional institution of marriage" can be interpreted as serving
to preserve "the traditional sexual mores of our society,, therefore
making it an invalid state expression of "moral disapproval. 1 0 3 Thus,
Justice Scalia argued that both Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor
had opened the door to courts' finding that gay people could not be
denied most, if any, rights.
The holding in Goodridge v. Department of PublicHealth'0 4 reveals the
impact that Romer and Lawrence's application of judicial scrutiny may
have on future challenges to the constitutionality of laws discriminating against gay people. The Massachusetts court, in legalizing samesex marriage, cited Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence, saying that
"whom to marry, how to express sexual intimacy, and whether and
how to establish a family.., are among the most basic of every individual's liberty and due process rights." Concurring in the decision,
Judge Greaney read Lawrence as Justice Scalia's dissent had predicted-that traditions and moral convictions do not provide a sufficient rational basis upon which to deem same-sex couples and their
families less worthy of similar legal recognition. 106
However, more than Lawrence, the court's analysis echoed Justice
Kennedy's Romer opinion in rejecting each of the three rationales asserted by the State of Massachusetts for prohibiting same-sex marriage. These included the interest in "providing a 'favorable setting
for procreation,"' an "optimal setting for child rearing" of one
mother and one father in the same household, and the need to "preserv[e] scarce State and private financial resources." 7
Rejecting the procreation argument, the court noted that Massachusetts used the "one unbridgeable difference" between gay and
non-gay couples, the ability to procreate, and then defined procreation as the "essence" of marriage."' Citing Romer, the court explained
that Massachusetts impermissibly used a single trait, the ability to
procreate, to prohibit one group-gay people-from the right to
marry, even though procreation is not a requirement of non-gay couples who marry.
The same argument pertained to the "child rearing" 1° rationale because there was no evidence that banning same-sex
Id. at 601.
Id. at 602.
104 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
105 Id. at 959.
IN Id. at 973 (GreaneyJ., concurring).
107 Id. at 961 (majority
opinion).
108 Id. at 962.
102

'o3

9 Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
10 Id. at 961.
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marriage would further the State's interest in encouraging more twoparent heterosexual families or that same-sex couples could not be
excellent families."'
Lastly, the court found no rational relationship between the marriage ban and the State's preservation of economic resources. The
State argued that same-sex couples were more financially sound than
non-gay couples, and therefore did not need the financial benefits afforded opposite sex couples." 2 The court noted that there was no
evidence that same-sex couples were more financially sound than opposite sex couples and it further noted that heterosexual couples, regardless of their financial status, could3 receive the same benefits that
the State wished to deny gay couples.1
Mirroring the sentiments of Romer, the court stated:
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real
segment of the community for no rational reason. The absence of any
reasonable relationship between, on the one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter into civil marriage and, on
the other, protection of public health, safety, or general welfare, suggests
that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against
(gay people].'

The court further noted that although private prejudice is outside
the law's reach, it cannot give such biases effect.' Therefore, Massachusetts had expressed no rational basis for its marriage restriction.
More recently, in Kansas v. Limon, the Kansas Supreme Court applied both Romer and Lawrence in holding that a "Romeo and Juliet
statute," which applied only to opposite sex pairs, violated the Equal
Protection Clause.
The appellant argued that the statute was unconstitutional because an offender whose underage partner was of
the opposite sex received more lenient sentences as a result of the
statute's protections, whereas an offender whose partner was of the
same sex was not covered under the law and thus faced harsher sentences for violations." 7 Even though the Lawrence majority limited its
analysis to the due process claim, the court reasoned that the decision recognized that the due process and equal protection analyses
"are inevitably linked" and require weighing nearly the same fac-

II Id. at 962-64.
1 Id. at 964.
11'
114

115
116

Id.

Id. at 968.
Id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
Kansas v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24 (Kan. 2005). The statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3522

(2004), created shorter prison terms where voluntary sexual acts occurred between a minor and
an adult, where the adult was less than nineteen years old and no more than four years older
than the minor, and the minor was fourteen or fifteen years of age.
17 Limon, 122
P.3d at 24.
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tors."' Finding that Lawrence applied in the equal protection context,
the court in Limon explained that "moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest."" 9 And although moralitybased laws are not "objectionable if the laws are applied fairly to all"
under equal protection, they are illegitimate when the "classifications
'the
are drawn for the purpose of invoking moral disapproval with
2
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."",

The Goodridge and Limon decisions suggest that lower and state
courts can more easily strike down laws discriminating against gay
people in the wake of Romer and Lawrence than they could prior to
these decisions.
B. The Limitations of Lawrence
1. The Exception of Same-Sex Marriage?
Although Lawrence may have given lower and state courts greater
ease in striking down discriminatory laws and allowed the court in
Goodridge to strike down restrictions on gay marriage, both Justice
Kennedy and Justice O'Connor said that Lawrence should not be read
as suggesting that there is not a rational basis for reserving marriage
to heterosexual couples. Justice Kennedy went out of his way to say
that the Texas sodomy law did "not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter," but instead involved the right of two mutually
consenting adults to engage in private sexual conduct.' 2' And Justice
O'Connor observed that "Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as... preserving the traditional institution of marriage.... [O]ther reasons exist to promote the institution 2of
mar2
riage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.,1
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, said that these disclaimers make
no sense in the context of the opinions as a whole. He wrote that,
just as the people may believe that their "disapprobation" of same-sex
conduct is great enough to support a ban on gay marriage but
not sufficient to criminalize the
conduct itself, "l[t] he
Court... pretend[ed] that it possesse[d] a similar freedom of

118

Id. at 34 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) in stating that "[e]quality

of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
advances both interests").
119Id. (emphasis added).
120 Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 633 (1996)).
121 Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 578.
1
Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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action. ....
," Justice Scalia argued that by suggesting that people in
same-sex relationships may seek autonomy for purposes such as "personal decisions relating to marriage, '24 Justice Kennedy's disclaimer
concerning gay marriage was inconsistent with the remainder of his
opinion. 25 Similarly, he argued that Justice O'Connor's stated legitimate interest for banning gay marriage-"preserving the traditional institution of marriage"-was simply "a kinder way of describing the [very] moral
disapproval" that her opinion suggested is not a
26
legitimate interest.
Justice Scalia correctly points out that both Justice Kennedy's and
Justice O'Connor's disclaimers regarding gay marriage do not fit
squarely with the "moral disapproval" reasoning on which their opinions are based. It may be that the Justices were simply trying to minimize public reaction to the decision. But, whatever the case, the unexplained disconnect between the marriage disclaimer and the
remainder of the opinions suggests that the marriage exclusion will
not survive judicial scrutiny in the long term.
2. Lower Courts May Read Lawrence More Narrowly
The fact that the Court did not recognize a fundamental right to
same-sex sodomy in Lawrence has allowed several lower and state
courts to apply the traditional doctrinal rules of rational basis review
to measures classifying on the basis of sexual orientation.1 7 The dissenting judges in Goodridge interpreted the Lawrence decision more
narrowly than the majority and argued that Lawrence merely decriminalized private behavior that violated one's liberty interest.18 In his
dissent, Judge Spina asserted that the Lawrence opinion did not demand formal public recognition of certain relationships by the government but simply greater due process protections when individual
privacy rights are denied as a result of unnecessary government restrictions.
Recently, in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family
Services, 30 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a Florida statute prohibiting
123 Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (citing id. at 574 (majority opinion)) (emphasis omitted).

125Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
126Id. at 601 (quoting id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis
omitted).
17 Some scholars have also read Lawrence as simply decriminalizing
private behavior that violated individual due process liberty interests. As suggested by Professor Schwartz, the Lawrence
holding is limited to "homosexual sodomy as a liberty interest and nothing more." Schwartz,
supra note 79, at 227.
128 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 986 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy,
J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 978 (Spina,J., dissenting).
130358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
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adoption by gay individuals. The court reasoned that Lawrence had
applied rational basis review in order "to establish a greater respect"
solely for the right of adults to engage in consensual sexual relations.13 1 It noted, however, that there was no fundamental-rights inquiry or recognition in the Lawrence decision. 132 The court further
narrowed the Lawrence holding by citing Justice Kennedy's explicit
explanation of what the case in Lawrence involved: "[t]he present
case [did] not involve minors." 3 This allowed the court in Lofton to
because the present case involved minors, Lawrence did not
hold that
134
apply.

Having concluded that there was no fundamental right at issue,
the court in Lofion referred to Romer in determining that gay people
are not a recognized suspect class and are therefore subject to rational basis review. 13 The court concluded that the State's asserted
interest in promoting adoption by married couples was a legitimate
interest and was unrelated to public morality. 3 6 The court also took
the opportunity to state that even if Florida had claimed an interest
in "protecting order and morality," 3 7 it would have been a "substantial" interest and not simply a legitimate one."'
The disparate holdings of lower and state courts that have resulted from differing interpretations of Lawrence reflect the confusion
that has stemmed from the Court's concurrent unwillingness to recognize a fundamental right to same-sex sodomy and considerable reduction of what satisfies a legitimate state interest for the purposes of
rational basis review. And while this means that anti-gay measures
can still be struck down more easily than they would under strict scrutiny, the Court's rulings in Romer and Lawrence have unquestionably

131Id. at 815-16. Several courts have interpreted the Lawrence analysis similarly narrowly. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that Lawrence stood
for the proposition that the Due Process Clause "protects the right of two individuals to engage
in fully and mutually consensual private sexual conduct"); Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378
F.3d 1232, 1236-38 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (finding that Lawrence applied rational basis without invoking strict scrutiny); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 139-40 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (finding that
the Lawrence majority applied rational basis review to determine the constitutionality of the
Texas law and thus concluding that a fundamental right of gay couples to marry is not implied
in the decision).
132 Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817.
133 Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
134 Id.
135 Id. at 817-18 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
136 Id. at 819.
137 Id. at 819 n.17 (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991)).
138 Id. (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569). The court did not reference Lawrence during this
discussion, most likely because of its narrow reading of the Lawrence decision and its desire not
to imbue it with broad authority and also because the court was considering the appellants'
equal protection challenge, not its due process claim.
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made it more difficult for anti-gay legislation to withstand rational basis review than it had been prior to these decisions.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN EXCLUSIVELY GAY SCHOOL UNDER
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW

A constitutional challenge to a state-sponsored school enrolling
only gay students raises the reverse argument of Romer. If the state
cannot single out gay people in order to deny them legal protections
simply because they are an unpopular group, can the state single out
gay people in order to protect them from private prejudice such as
harassment? Under rational basis review of laws applying identity
classifications, a state cannot burden a disadvantaged group out of a
bare desire to harm or stigmatize them, but it may single out a disadvantaged group for the purpose of benefiting or protecting the group
from discrimination as long as there is a legitimate interest.
In his majority opinion in Romer,Justice Kennedy explained,
[T]he amendment imposes a special disability upon [homosexuals]
alone.... We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2
withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transac19
tions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society. 3

Rational basis review actually encourages benign legislation. As
the Court in Cleburne explained, legislation
singling out [a group] for special treatment [often] reflects .. . real and
undeniable differences between [them] and others. That a civilized and
decent society expects and approves such legislation indicates that governmental consideration of those differences in the vast majority of situations is not only legitimate but also desirable. 14°

The Court argued that because many groups have special abilities
and needs, "governmental bodies must have a certain amount of
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limiting their remedial efforts.' 4 1
If a legitimate state interest is asserted for singling out gay people
and its purpose is rationally related to that interest and not meant to
harm the group, such a program or legislation will withstand rational
basis review. Moreover, even if the court believes there is a problem
to remedy, there is a less burdensome remedy, or the remedy does
not adequately address the scope of the problem, the court will still
not interfere so long as the state purports to have a legitimate reason

M Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
140City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444 (1985).
141Id. at 445.
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to believe it may be warranted. 4 2 An argument by a state that a gay
school-exclusive or not-is rationally related to the state's interest
in remedying anti-gay harassment should be sufficient to satisfy rational basis review.
A. RationalBasis Review Applies to Claims Involving Real or Perceived
Sexual Conduct, Sexual Identities, and Transsexuality
Sexual orientation-related laws may deal with those who engage in
or are perceived to engage in homosexual conduct, those who identify as or are perceived to be homosexual, and those who identify as
or are perceived to be transsexual. This multiplicity is especially clear
in the context of a gay school where students are young and may fit
within any one or more than one of these categories. Even though
the Milk School or schools like it may be a conglomeration of these
groups, courts, as evidenced by the Court in Romer and Lawrence,
rarely distinguish between these categories 3 and have consistently
considered laws related to real or perceived homosexual conduct and
homosexual identity under rational basis review.' 44 Statutes related to

Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1955).
Romer applied rational basis review to an ordinance that discriminated on the basis
of
"homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." 517 U.S. at
624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b). In Lawrence,Justice Kennedy argued that rights regarding sexual acts are directly related to the human relationships of those who participate in
those acts. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
4 Those cases considering the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy of the U.S.
military, compelling the discharge of gay service members and those who engage in homosexual conduct but do
not necessarily identify as gay, serve as good examples of courts' similar treatment of gay people, those perceived to be gay, and those who engage in same-sex intimate conduct. See 10
U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (codifying the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy). Janet Halley observes that
[d]oing things that make your commander think you are gay-like making pro-gay
statements, or cutting your hair a certain way, or not fitting the gender stereotype of the
sex you belong to-can be the basis for an inference that you have engaged in or might
someday engage in homosexual conduct ....
JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY 2 (1999). Sexual propensity refers equally to "homosexual status" and "homosexual acts." Id. at 16.
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997), provides one
example of the nondifferentiation that is common among circuit courts that have considered
military discharges. Philips involved the discharge of a naval service member who had disclosed
his homosexuality. The court, applying rational basis review, found no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 1429. The majority held "that the relationship between the Navy's
mission and its policy on homosexual acts is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary and irrational." Id. According to the court, the exclusion of openly gay service members
or those engaging in homosexual conduct, who may threaten the cohesion of units and its
overall capability, is rationally related to "maintaining effective armed forces." Id. at 1424-26.
Although the service member in Philips had acknowledged that he was homosexual and that
he also engaged in homosexual acts, the court discussed the application of rational basis review
to the discharge of both self-identified gays and those engaging or unrebuttably presumed to
have engaged in homosexual conduct:
142
14
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145
transsexual identity are also considered under rational basis review.

B. Courts Consistently Recognize That Schools Have a Duty to Protect Gay
Studentsfrom Harassment
Courts have long recognized that schools have a constitutional
duty to ensure that students have equal access to learning in an educational environment and are therefore obliged to take measures to
prevent harassment that could interfere with this access. Appellate
courts have repeatedly held that no rational basis exists for failure to
protect gay students from harassment by teachers or, as is most often
the case, other students.

Homosexual conduct is grounds for separation from the Military Services .... Homosexual conduct includes homosexual acts, a statement by a member that
demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, or a homosexual
marriage or attempted marriage. A statement by a member that demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts is grounds for separation not because it reflects the member's sexual orientation, but because the statement indicates a likelihood
that the member engages in or will engage in homosexual acts.
Id. at 1424 (quoting DEP'T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 1332.14 E3.Al.1.8.1.1.
(1993)). The court affirmed that discharges on any of these grounds are subject only to rational basis review because homosexuals are not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Id.
at 1425.
145 Many of the students attending The Milk School are transsexual
youth. Transsexuals are
not necessarily homosexual: their identities are defined not by whom they share intimate or
sexual relations with, but rather by how they perceive their sex or gender. Transsexuals may be
defined as "person[s] who psychologically identif[y] with the opposite sex and may seek to live
as a member of this sex [especially] by undergoing surgery and hormone therapy to obtain the
necessary physical appearance (as by changing the external sex organs)." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1330 (11th ed. 2003). One could argue that discrimination against or
segregation of transsexuals falls within the category of sex or gender discrimination, making it
subject to intermediate scrutiny, and not within the classification of "sexual orientation." However, as evidenced by cases such as Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), and Reyes-Reyes v.
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004), courts have subsumed transsexuality or gender identity
within the term "sexual orientation" or have simply linked them and thus subjected laws directed at transsexuals to rational basis scrutiny.
In Farmer,the Court defined transsexuals as having "'[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a
person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and... typically seeks
medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex
change." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829 (quoting AM. MED. ASS'N, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006
(1989)). In Reyes-Reyes, the Ninth Circuit considered the political asylum claim of a refugee described by the court as "a homosexual male with a female sexual identity. He dresses and looks
like a woman, wearing makeup and a woman's hairstyle." Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785. The
court linked the refugee's sexual identity with sexual orientation, finding that "Reyes's sexual
orientation, for which he was targeted, and his transsexual behavior are intimately connected."
Id. at 785 n.1.
Despite the fact that gender identity would arguably constitute sex and therefore make it a
quasi-suspect classification subject to intermediate scrutiny, the courts that have considered
transsexuality have applied rational basis review.
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"' the Seventh Circuit
In Nabozny v. Podlesny,46
held that there was no
"'reasonably conceivable state of facts' that would provide a rational
basis for the government's conduct.... [in] permitting one student

to assault another based on the victim's sexual orientation.'

4

1

Jamie

Nabozny was the victim of repeated physical abuse and harassment
throughout middle school and high school by peers as a result of his
homosexuality. 14 Despite the school's policy of punishing battery
and sexual harassment by students, some school officials ignored
Nabozny's pleas
for help, while some officials allegedly took part in
149
the mocking.

Holding that a fact-finder could reasonably find that Nabozny's
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights were violated based
on both his gender and sexual orientation, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded
the case.150 The court found that "the Constitution prohibits intentional invidious discrimination between otherwise similarly situated
persons based on one's membership in a definable minority, absent
at least a rational basis for the discrimination.''. Because the court
concluded that "[t]here can be little doubt that homosexuals are an
identifiable minority subjected to discrimination in our society," it
held that discrimination based on5 homosexuality is constitutionally
prohibited absent a rational basis.1 1
3
The Ninth Circuit, in Flores v. Morgan Hill United School District,'

followed Nabozny in holding that the failure of a school district to enforce a student's right to be free from intentional discrimination and
peer harassment, and to prevent emotional and physical harm to students who were or were perceived to be gay, was sufficient evidence
for a jury to find that the school district had violated the student's
constitutional equal protection rights. 54 Alana Flores had discovered
pornography and notes reading " [d]ie, dyke bitch" in her locker, as
well as graffiti on the outside of the locker. 5 5 When Flores repeatedly
confronted the assistant principal about the harassment, her appeals
for action were denied and she was told not to bring such "trash" to
the principal in the future.5 Another plaintiff in the suit was hospi-

146
147
148
149

92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 458 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993)).
Id. at 449.
Id.

150 Id. at 449, 460-61.
151 Id. at 457.
152

Id.
324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003).
154 Id. at
1132.
155 Id. at
1133.
156 Id.
15
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talized with bruised ribs after six students saying "[flaggot, you don't
belong here," beat the student. 157 1Only
one of the six students in58
volved in the beating was disciplined.

Holding that gay people are not recognized as a suspect or quasisuspect class, the court nonetheless concluded that gay students are a
definable group entitled to basic rational basis review. 59 The court
held that the Equal Protection Clause "requires the defendants to enforce District policies in cases of peer harassment of homosexual and
bisexual students in the same way that they enforce those policies in
cases of peer harassment of heterosexual students."' 6° The court
could not identify any rational basis for allowing students to harass
others based on their sexual orientation; it therefore held that, by allowing such harassment, the school violated the students' equal protection rights. 6 '
C. Applying RationalBasis Review in Determiningthe Constitutionality of
Gay Schools
The Milk School contends that, because gay students are vulnerable to abuse in community schools, a special school is necessary in
order to protect them. Beyond the physical threats posed by attendance in mainstream schools, the School argues that the mental and
emotional effects of harassment and threat of harm create a need for
special support in a separate school.162 Thus, both a school aimed at
gay youth, but open to all, and a school exclusively for gay youth
should survive rational basis scrutiny. Such a remedy is rationally related to an interest in preventing anti-gay harassment.

157

Id.
Id. There were five additional plaintiffs, all of whom claimed that they were subjected to
repeated taunting, slurs, and obscene gestures and that administrators took no action to stop
the harassment. Id.
1

159 Id. at 1137.
160Id.
161 Id. at 1138. For examples of other cases holding that
discriminatory treatment of students
harassed because they are gay is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause, see Doe v. Perry
Community School District,316 F. Supp. 2d 809, 829 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (holding that discrimination
in the treatment of students who are harassed based on sexual orientation is prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause); Montgomery v. Independent School District No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1089 (D. Minn. 2000) (holding that discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited
under the Equal Protection Clause where a school district failed to protect a student perceived
as gay from harassment).
162 See Hetrick-Martin Institute, F.A.Q's, supra note 3 (describing
why the Milk School was
created); see also Herszenhorn, supra note 17, at A12 (discussing the Milk School's justifications
for the school).
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One survey of gay youth found that more than ninety percent had
heard anti-gay slurs from peers in school.163 Another survey found
that more than one-third of students surveyed reported that they had
heard homophobic remarks from school faculty and staff.164 In 2003,
two-thirds of gay youth surveyed felt unsafe at school and a majority
had experienced some form of harassment.16 5 Similarly, a 1999 survey
revealed that nearly forty-six percent of those gay youth reporting
harassment experienced daily verbal abuse, more than twenty-seven
percent experienced physical harassment, and approximately fourteen percent were physically assaulted.16 6 One study suggested that
gay youth were also four times more likely than non-gay youth to be
threatened with a weapon by another student on school property. 67
Gay students experiencing harassment reported that more than
thirty-nine percent of the time neither school staff nor other students
intervened after hearing homophobic slurs.'6
A Massachusetts study found that, as a result of harassment in
schools, gay students were five times more likely than non-gay students to miss school. 9 It is estimated that nearly twenty-five percent
of homeless youth are gay.
Forty percent of gay youth attempt suicide,' making them three times more likely than non-gay youth to
commit suicide. 72 Twenty-eight percent of gay teens drop out of

163JOSEPH G. KoscIw, THE 2003 NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY:
THE SCHOOL RELATED
EXPERIENCES OF OUR NATION'S LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH 5 (2003),

availableat http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLSENATTACHMENTS/file/300-3.PDF.
Sexuality Info. and Educ. Council of the U.S. (SIECUS), Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and

Transgender Youth Issues, 29 SIECUS REP. 3 (Supp. 2001), available at http://www.siecus.org/
pubs/fact/FS lgbtyouth_issues.pdf. In one study, fifty percent of female respondents and
thirty-seven percent of male respondents reported that when homosexuality was discussed in
class, it was discussed in a negative manner. See Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey
Milk School, LGBTQ Youth Statistics, http://www.hmi.org/HOME/Article/Params/articles/
1320/pathlist/s1036 ol222/default.aspx#iteml320 (last visitedJan. 27, 2005).
KOSCIW, supra note 163, at 12-14 (revealing the prevalence of anti-gay harassment
in
schools).
166 SIECUS, supra note 164, at
3.
167 Id.
168

Id.

169 Kim

Paula Kirkley, Don't Forget the Safety Net That All-Gay Schools Provide in Considering the

Issues Raised by All-Female Public Education, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 127, 133 (1997) (citing
MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC., MASSACHUSETTS HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
RESULTS OF THE 1995 YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEY (1995)).
170 Id. at 135 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE (1989)).

171 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School, LGBTQYouth
Statistics, supra
note 164.
172 Bethard, supra note 6, at 418 (citing NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N,
BULLYING IN SCHOOLS:
HARASSMENT
PUTS GAY YOUTH AT RISK, available at http://www.nmha.org/pbedu/
backtoschool/bullyingGayYouth.pdf).
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school each year,'73 which is three times higher than the national average drop out rate."' Additionally, gay youth are twice as likely as
5
high school youth on the whole to anticipate not attending college.1
The success of the Milk School is further evidence of a rational
basis for such a school. Whereas gay youth in traditional schools are
far more likely to drop out of school and less likely than other students to pursue higher education, students at the Harvey Milk High
School have a ninety-five percent graduation rate, and sixty percent
pursue higher education.
The Harvey Milk School is open to all
students regardless of their sexual orientation and does not exclude
students on that basis."'

Therefore, it should be easily safe from a

constitutional challenge even disregarding much of the data described above." 8 As the Tenth Circuit held in Villanueva v. Carere,
charter schools meant to increase opportunities for "at-risk pupils"
will not trigger heightened scrutiny where the statute creating the
schools explicitly makes enrollment open to any child living in the
school district."- However, the statistics suggest that the problem of
harassment for at-risk students is so pervasive and the harassment so
specific to their real or perceived sexual orientation that even if the
Milk School explicitly prohibited non-gay students from admission, a
school district has a rational basis for maintaining such a school.
As the data discussed show, gay youth are far more likely to be harassed because of their sexual orientation than other students. This
has led to greater absentee and dropout rates and thus lower college
attendance rates among gay students. The harassment may also contribute to the higher suicide and runaway rates reported among gay
youth.' s° Harvey Milk students appear uniquely situated to support an
argument that gay students require different accommodations than
their non-gay counterparts.

173 Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey
Milk School, LGBTQYouth Statistics, supra
note 164 (internal citation omitted).

174Bethard, supra note 6, at 418 (citing NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH
ASS'N, supra note 172).
175

KOSCIW, supra note 163, at 23.

176Hetrick-Martin Institute: Home of the Harvey Milk School,
F.A.Q's, supra note 3.
177

Id.
178Several scholars assume that the open enrollment of the Milk
School protects it from an

equal protection challenge. See, e.g., Maurice R. Dyson, Essay, Safe Rules or Gays' Schools? The
Dilemma of Sexual Orientation Segregation in Public Education, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 195-97

(2004) (discussing equal protection claims against discriminatory school officials); Kristina Brittenham, Comment, Equal Protection Theory and the Harvey Milk High School:
Why AntiSubordination Alone Is Not Enough, 45 B.C. L. REv. 869, 893-94 (2004) (assuming that a school
with open enrollment should pass constitutional muster).
1
85 F.3d 481, 488 (10th Cir. 1996).
180See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (discussing homeless rates and
suicide rates

among gay youth).
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The fact that non-gay students may also face harassment in their
home schools and may not have a similar option is irrelevant to
whether a gay school can survive rational basis review because, as the
Court said in Lee Optical, a legislature may remedy evils "one step at a
time" and remedy some areas while "neglecting the others.".. It is
also irrelevant that there may be less extreme measures to remedy
anti-gay harassment because a court will not strike down a program
that pursues a legitimate interest even though the remedy "may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought."8 Both a school open for all and one open exclusively to
gay students should survive the Court's rational basis review.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY TO BENIGN MEASURES
MEANT TO REMEDY ANTI-GAY DISCRIMINATION

Although most Supreme Court decisions considering the constitutionality of classifications on the basis of sexual orientation or conduct reviewed statutes discriminating against gay people, the Court's
recent rulings on affirmative action programs for racial minorities or
all-female institutions suggest that benign legislation is subject to the
same level of scrutiny as measures discriminating against a suspect
class. 183
Benign discrimination is subject to heightened scrutiny because
these group classifications are assumed to be "in most circumstances
irrelevant and therefore prohibited"'8 4 because "whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that
person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language
and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection."' As a
result, "despite the surface appeal of holding 'benign' racial classifications to a lower standard, ... [im]ore than good motives should be
required when government seeks to allocate its resources by way of an
explicit racial classification system. ' "' 6
Because benign programs aimed at remedying anti-gay discrimination would have to withstand the same heightened scrutiny as malignant legislation, the irony is that suspect status recognition may no

v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
Id. at 488.
183 Brittenham, supra note
178, at 894.
184 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995) (quoting Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)); see also City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("[Llaws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect
prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving
as others.").
185 Adarand, 515 U.S. at
229-30.
186 Id. at 226 (internal
citations omitted).
181Williamson

182
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.
,
181
Were gay people recognized as a suspect or
longer be desirable.
quasi-suspect class, it would be more difficult for benign legislation
intended to remedy anti-gay discrimination to withstand judicial scrutiny. Programs such as an exclusively gay school would be unlikely to
be upheld under this level ofjudicial review.

A. The Application of Strict Scrutiny to Benign Legislation
Whereas rational basis review presumes the constitutionality and
desirability of state legislation aimed at most groups, strict scrutiny
presumes legislation to be unconstitutional unless found to be "nar88
rowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.'
Heightened review is only applied to "suspect classes,"'8 9 such as African Americans, aliens, and other ethnic minorities, who "1) have suffered a history of discrimination; 2) exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group;
and 3) show that they are a minority or politically powerless, or alternatively show that the statutory classification at issue burdens a fundamental right."9 ' Suspect status is justified in these cases because
the "factors [on which such classifications are based] are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy
or deserving as others."' 9'

187 See Brittenham, supra note 178, at 894-95 (arguing
that the "unreasonable results" of the
parallel scrutiny given to affirmative action dictate that the Harvey Milk High School be found
constitutional).
IRSGrutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
189 Justice Black, writing for the majority in Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
stated that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect." Id. at 216; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 486 (1980) (holding racial and ethnic classifications suspect because of the United States' historical tolerance for using
such "criteria for the purpose or with the effect of imposing an invidious discrimination").
190 High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th
Cir. 1990)
(citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987)).
191 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Noting that the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, the
Court in Loving v. Virginia explained that it could not imagine a legitimate reason for legislation
making "the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense." 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Racial classifications "must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States." McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192; see also City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.").
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In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,192 the Court held that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny."' 93 The Court found that remedial racial measures, in this
case, giving preferences to small businesses owned by "socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals" 194 in federal subcontracting
bids, had to be just as narrowly tailored as measures discriminating
against suspect classes. 95 Justice Thomas argued in his concurrence
that "government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign
prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious
prejudice. In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple."'99 Although Justice Thomas's words did not appear in Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion, the reasoning behind them was present in O'Connor's assertion that "benign" classifications are equally
suspect to malicious ones. 97 The idea of racial equality is linked to
the ideal of a colorblind society. Only when racial categories are invisible does the Court believe racial equality has been achieved.
More recently, in Grutter v. Bollinger9s the Court reaffirmed the
need for applying the strictest scrutiny to all racial classifications.
Justice O'Connor explained that a major purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment "was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race." 26 ° The Court, after applying strict scrutiny to race-conscious admissions policies, found that the consideration of race in admissions decisions at the University of Michigan Law
School was permissible, if narrowly tailored. 20 ' But, the Court went
further by only finding race-conscious programs constitutional when
they terminate "as soon as practicable."

515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Id. at 227. In deciding Adarand,the Court relied on its earlier decision in Croson, in which
strict scrutiny was applied to a remedy aimed at increasing the number of minority-owned companies receiving city contracts. See Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
192

193

194

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204.

'9-

1 See id. at 227 ("[H] olding 'benign' state and federal racial classifications to different standards does not square with [the idea that the Equal Protection Clause protects persons rather
than groups].").
196 Id. at 241 (Thomas,J, concurring).
197See id. at 226 (plurality opinion) (stating that "more than good
motives" are needed to
warrant the use of racial classifications).
198

539 U.S. 306 (2003).

Id. at 326 ("We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests." (internal citations omitted)).
200 Id. at 341 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
201 Id. at 343.
202Id. ("We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be
necessary to further the interest approved today.").
199
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just as benign racial classifications require the same degree of
scrutiny as classifications based upon invidious discrimination, sexbased classifications, even those intended to benefit women, must
withstand an intermediate level of scrutiny. The quasi-suspect status
of women is justified on the grounds that there is a long history of sex
discrimination in the United States, that women continue to face discrimination largely the result of historical stereotypes, and that, like
race, sex is an immutable characteristic which usually has no relation
to one's ability to perform or make the same meaningful contributions to society of which men are considered capable.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in United States v. Virginia
(VAM),204 explained that the reason for the quasi-suspect status of
women is that, whereas it is recognized that there are no inherent differences between black and white people, "[p]hysical differences between men and women.., are enduring" and may be used "to advance full development of the talent and capacities" of women, 205 but
cannot be used "to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.
In Craig v. Boren, the Court found that prohibiting men under
twenty-one from buying liquor while permitting women over eighteen
to do so violated the Equal Protection Clause because it did not
"serve important governmental objectives and [was not] substantially
related to achievement of those objectives., 20 8 Since this ruling, the
Court has clarified this intermediate level of scrutiny by explaining
that "the proffered justification [must be] 'exceedingly persuasive. 2

203In Frontierov. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683-87 (1973), the Court explained the peculiar
situation of sex classification:
[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to the ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result,
statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of
its individual members.
Id. at 686-87 (internal citations omitted).
M 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
205 Id. at 533.
206 Id. at 534.

207429 U.S. 190 (1976).

Id. at 197; see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding that
excluding men from a publicly funded school violated the Equal Protection Clause because the
exclusion did not serve "important governmental objectives" and that the exclusion of men was
"substantially related to the achievement of those objectives" (quoting Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980))).
2W VM/, 518 U.S. at 533 (internal citations omitted). To withstand constitutional muster, the
law must serve "important governmental objectives and... the discriminatory means employed
[must be] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Id. at 524 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 424).
N8
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Justice Ginsburg explained that sex-based stereotypes could not
form the basis for an "exceedingly persuasive justification" when the
Court held that women could not be excluded from the Virginia Military Institute in VM. 2'0 The Institute's justifications for the exclusion
of women, that single-sex education produces unique educational
benefits and that the school's character development and leadership
training would have to be modified if women
211 were accepted, failed
the "exceedingly persuasive justification" test.
As evidenced by cases such as Newberg v. Board of Public Education,
single-sex public schools have not fared much better than the Virginia Military Institute. 2 In Newberg, the court found that Philadelphia's all-female Girls High School and the all-male Central High
School were materially unequal because of differences in the facilities, teacher experience, and equipment, among other factors.1
More recently, a district court found that a Detroit public school limited to "at-risk" males could not withstand intermediate scrutiny.1 4
The court in Garrettv. Board of Educationfound that there was no evidence that a coeducational school bore a substantial relationship to
the difficulties faced by "at-risk" males.2 5
B. A School Exclusively for Gay Youth Would Not Likely Survive Heightened
Scrutiny
In order for a gay school to survive strict scrutiny, the state would
have to show that the program was "narrowly tailored" to "further
compelling governmental interests. 216 To withstand intermediate
scrutiny, the state would have to offer an "exceedingly persuasive justification" to explain why the challenged "classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are217 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.'

As discussed in Part IV.A above, only in very limited situations will
the Court uphold state legislation or programs that classify on the basis of a suspect class.
There exists an assumption that
"[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.
210

211

Id. at 556.
Id. at 557-58; see also Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (hold-

ing that an all-male school aimed at educating urban males was illegal because it made no showing that coeducation had led to male students' poor educational performance).
212 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682 (Phila. County Ct. C.P. 1983).
213 Id.
214 Garrett,775 F. Supp.
at 1007-08.
215 Id. at 1008.
216Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
217United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting
Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
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Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact
promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial
hostility."2 18 And, even where a remedial measure is justified, it must
be "narrowly tailored" so that programs carry the least risk of causing
stigmatic harm or promoting hostility towards a suspect class. In the
context of schools segregated according to race, Justice Scalia explained that race-conscious remedies should be strictly limited in the
context of schools to situations in which 2 a19"dual school system" is being perpetuated and must be dismantled.
Based upon the Court's reluctance to segregate on the basis of any
suspect classification and the corresponding concerns about the
group stigmatization that could result, an exclusively gay school is not
likely to survive heightened scrutiny. This is especially true because
even if the remedy were accepted as necessary by the Court, it would
almost certainly be struck down as not being narrowly tailored.
First, the state would have to show that the least extreme measure
which could be taken to effectively correct anti-gay harassment in
schools would be to completely remove these students from their
home schools. It would be very difficult to explain why adequate
programs to protect gay students could not be established in their
own home schools. As discussed in Part III.B above, many other
courts have required school districts to offer equal protection to gay
students facing harassment, and none of those districts have remedied the problem by establishing separate schools.
Second, the state would have to explain why heterosexual students
facing physical and emotional harassment in these same schools are
not included in the remedial program. Because the Harvey Milk
School is not an exclusively gay school, it may be able to avoid this
question. However, an exclusively gay school would have the more
difficult task of using the data discussed in Part III.C above, to make a
compelling argument that this harassment is so unique to gay youth
that there exists a compelling justification for the school. Finally, the
tremendous disparities in spending on students at the Milk School as
218City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
219

justice Scalia, concurring in Croson, wrote:

In my view there is only one circumstance in which the States may act by race to "undo the
effects of past discrimination": where that is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification.... This distinction explains our
school desegregation cases, in which we have made plain that States and localities sometimes have an obligation to adopt race conscious remedies. While there is no doubt that
those cases have taken into account the continuing "effects" of previously mandated racial school assignment, we have held those effects to justify a race-conscious remedy only
because we have concluded, in that context, that they perpetuate a "dual school system."
We have stressed each school district's constitutional "duty to dismantle its dual system,"
and have found that "[e]ach instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty
continues the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
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opposed to other public schools in New York, a difference of more
than three to one, would almost certainly be found not to have a
"compelling justification" under an equal protection analysis.
One circumstance in which an argument for an exclusively gay
school could potentially survive heightened scrutiny would require a
showing that harassment of gay students is so rampant and ugly and
that the current drop-out and suicide rates among these youth are so
much greater than non-gay students facing similar treatment, that
segregation is necessary for a temporary period of time until the
school district can test and implement programs that will adequately
address the state's failure to protect students."' Just as Justice
O'Connor placed a durational limit on the amount of time that race
22 1
could be considered as a factor in law school admissions in Grutter,
so too might a court recognize the level of harassment faced by gay
youth to be a sufficient enough "crisis" as to require the establishment of a temporary or short-term gay school while the district develops alternative, less extreme long-term measures.
The Court has been similarly reluctant to find single-sex schools
constitutional under intermediate scrutiny. Concerns that female
students have been stigmatized, stereotyped, and assumed to be unable to perform at the same level as their male colleagues have led
the Court to strike down both all-male and all-female schools. The
Court's opinions in VM/ and earlier cases considered under intermediate scrutiny discussed in Part LV.A above suggest that it would be
unlikely to find an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for a school
exclusively devoted to gay students, especially if the school would
have the effect of "creat[ing] or perpetuat[ing] the legal, social, and
222
economic inferiority" of the quasi-suspect group.
Perhaps only if Justice Rehnquist's thirty-year-old dissent in
Boren2 23 was controlling would an exclusively gay school survive intermediate scrutiny. Arguing that intermediate scrutiny should not have
been applied to a case in which a law prohibiting men under twentyone from purchasing alcohol while allowing women over eighteen to
2W Norman Siegel, former Executive Director of the New York Civil Liberties
Union, argues
that because the Harvey Milk School educates fewer than 200 children and there are thousands
of gay students in the city's schools, the school district should "take on institutional homophobia" and create stronger programs throughout the city's schools. Herszenhorn, supranote 17,
at A12 (quoting Norman Siegel). Although Siegel has a valid point, he may overlook the immediate threat of harm posed to certain students if left in their current schools. Institutional
change often takes years, if not decades. And his statement further overlooks the fact that the
Milk School is not intended for all gay students, but for those who are most at risk for harassment or peer- or self-inflicted harm.
221 See 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003) (suggesting a twenty-five-year
limit for consideration of race
in admissions).
VM1, 518 U.S. at 534.
223 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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do so was invalidated, Rehnquist stated that men were not victims of a
history of discrimination.2 4 He wrote that "[t] here is no suggestion
in the Court's opinion that males in this age group are in any way peculiarly disadvantaged, subject to systematic discriminatory treatment,
or otherwise in need of special solicitude from the courts." 225

The

Court, Justice Rehnquist argued, should apply heightened scrutiny
only to situations in which discrimination against women was at issue.2 2 6 Here men were the sole objects of the discrimination, he suggested.227 If this dissent was controlling, heterosexuals challenging an
exclusively gay school, like men in Boren, would not be subject to
heightened scrutiny. However, Justice Rehnquist's dissent has never
been adopted and the Court has shown an even greater willingness to
apply heightened scrutiny to legislation meant to discriminate against
either men or women, since Boren was decided in 1976.28
V. THE DESIRABILITY OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION-RELATED LAWS TODAY

Although a strong argument can still be made in favor of granting
suspect status to gay people, the numerous arguments that may be
made against suspect status today reflect the fact that many advances
have been made by gay people in the two decades since the Court affirmed the constitutionality of same-sex sodomy laws in Bowers v.
Hardwick.2 29 States and municipalities today are passing legislation
and implementing programs to benefit gay people in many areas of
law. As of 2005, a majority of gay Americans are protected from discrimination in areas such as private employment and against hatemotivated crimes. 230 Such advances suggest that the struggle for gay
equality may be reaching a crossroads in which homophobic attitudes
are beginning to lose in the court of public opinion. As such, although suspect status would remain an effective tool for protecting
groups in states and localities in which change is occurring more
slowly, the desirability of suspect status must be considered in light of
the impact strict scrutiny would likely have on benign classifications.
Because the Court is more deferential to state and local legislative

Id. at 218-19 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
Id. at 219.
226 Id. at 219-20.
224
225

227

Id.

228

See supra Part IV.A (describing application of heightened scrutiny to all sex-based classifi-

cations).
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (finding that heightened scrutiny did not apply to homosexuals
in
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer a fundamental right on gay people to
engage in sodomy).
2
See infta notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
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programs under rational basis review, today less judicial intervention
may be preferable to more.
A. The Casefor Suspect Status Today at a Crossroads
An argument can almost certainly be made for granting suspect
status to gay people. The Court considers several factors in determining whether a group constitutes a suspect class. First, the group must
have a history of purposeful discrimination. 3 ' Second, the Court
considers whether the discrimination faced by the group is so unfair
as to be invidious. 232 Determining whether the discrimination is invidious requires consideration of whether a classification on the basis
of the suspect status relates to a person's ability to contribute to society, whether the classification is reflective of stereotypical or prejudicial attitudes, and whether the class is defined by an immutable
trait.23 3 Finally, the Supreme Court considers whether the burdened
group lacks
power to seek redress from the other branches of gov234
ernment.
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in 1988, made a strong argument that gay people constitute a suspect class in Watkins v. United
States Army. M The court first described a history of discrimination
against homosexuals in both public and private spheres. It noted
that many states prohibited gays from "certain jobs and schools, and
have prevented homosexuals [from] marriage. 36 In the private sector, gays have been discriminated against in hiring, housing, and in
houses of worship.237
However, it is unclear whether anti-gay discrimination would satisfy the "history of discrimination" prong in light of Justice Scalia's
opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg.

He stated that a fundamental

right must be "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 3 9
However, in its discussion regarding the right to same-sex sodomy,

231 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (citing City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)). The Watkins court referenced
the factors applied by the United States Supreme Court. The factors discussed are not unique
to the Ninth Circuit.
232 Id. at 724.
233 Id. at 724-25. The Ninth Circuit explained that courts
have never suggested that "immutability" be so strictly defined as to mean that the trait cannot be physically changed. The court
gives the example that gender is considered immutable even though a woman, for example,
could have an operation to become a man. Id.
234 Id. at 726.
235 Id. at 728.
236 Id. at 724.
237 Id.
238 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
239 Id. at 721 (internal quotations omitted).
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the Lawrence majority noted that sexual identities did not emerge until the end of the 19th century, 240 and that laws specifically focused on

homosexual conduct did not arise until recently. 241 This does not
dispose of the fact that discriminatory actions such as raids on gay establishments, 242 the prevalence of hate-motivated crimes by private
citizens,243 and the exclusion of gay people from participation in clubs
and governmental bodies such as the military244 have been widespread
over the course of recent history. However, it raises questions as to
whether the history prong of the suspect status can be met.
With reference to the second factor, whether the group has been
treated so unfairly that the discrimination is invidious, the court in
Watkins noted that sexual orientation is irrelevant to one's contribution to society. The court cited the fact that the plaintiff-a military
sergeant who had been informed that he would be discharged from
the military 245because of his homosexuality-had an "exemplary" military record.
The irrelevance of sexuality to one's ability to contribute to society suggested to the court that sexual orientation-based
classifications had to be based on prejudice and stereotypes. 246
The issue of "immutability" is more controversial today because
there is disagreement as to whether homosexuals have an "immutable
trait." The Ninth Circuit noted that the "immutability" factor has
never been construed strictly, citing the fact that people can have
surgical operations to change their sex, aliens can become citizens,
illegitimate children
can be legitimated, and people of color can
24
"pass" as white.

'

But the immutability of sexuality remains a point of

public and scientific debate. A 2003 CBS News/New York Times poll
showed that forty-four percent of respondents believed homosexual-

240

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003).

See id. ("[T]here is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed
at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter."). For historical backgrounds of the construction of sexual identities in the United States, see, for example, JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE
MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (1988) (offering a general history of sexuality in
America); DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988) (considering
the social construction of sexuality); JONATHAN KATZ, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALI'Y
(1995) (arguing that sexuality is a recent historical construction).
242 See GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK, 1890-1940 (1995) (examining the history of vice
squads and raids of gay bars in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century New York).
24t

243

See HATE CRIMES:

CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (Gregory
M.

Herek & Kevin T. Berrill eds., 1992) (discussing the history and extent of anti-gay motivated
hate crimes).
24 See generally ALLAN BtRUBE, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE:

THE HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND

WOMEN IN WORLD WAR Two (1990) (describing the repression of homosexuality in the U.S.
military); RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS & LESBIANS IN THE U.S. MILITARY (1993)

(describing the military's ban on gay people serving in the military).
245 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th
Cir. 1989).
246 Id.
247 Id. at 726.
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ity was a choice, while another forty-four percent believed it was not
something that could be changed.2 8 Scientists continue to research
whether sexuality
is a biology-based trait or a choice, whether uncon249
scious or not.
As for the final factor, whether gay people are a politically powerless group, the Watkins court noted that "social, economic, and political pressures to conceal one's homosexuality
•
•
operate to discourage
•
,,250
gays from openly protesting anti-homosexual governmental action.
The court further noted that even those who are openly gay often
face animus and thus their ability to participate effectively in politics
is limited.
More so, elected officials often have difficulty empathizing with homosexuals."2 Today, however, it can be debated whether
or not gay people are politically powerless-especially depending on
how one measures group political power. Responding to this question in his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia argued that it was "preposterous" to refer to gay people as politically powerless, since even though
gays made up only four percent of the population, they had "enormous influence in American media and politics," as evidenced by the
fact that forty-six percent of voters in Colorado voted against Amendment 2.2
At the national level, it may be argued that gay political power is
limited. Polls show that gays constitute approximately four to five
percent of the national vote.
Only three of 435 Congressmen (less
than one percent) ,25and no U.S. Senators, 6 are gay. Gay advocates
have been unsuccessful in getting federal legislation to remedy discrimination passed and unable to counter anti-gay legislation such as
the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") .257 However, it can also be
argued that these failures are not the result of powerlessness, but of
the concentration of gay votes behind Democratic Party candidates.
248

Opposition to Gay Marriage Grows, CBS NEWS, Dec. 21, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/

stories/2003/12/19/opinion/polls/main589551.shtml.
The poll was conducted from a nationwide sample of 1057 adults with a three percent margin of error. Id.
249 For an overview of this debate and references to studies and
articles considering the question, see Ryan D. Johnson, Homosexuality: Nature or Nurture, ALLPSYcHi J., Apr. 30, 2003,
http://allpsych.com/journal/homosexuality.html (describing the debate about the roots of
homosexuality).
250Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

25

Paul Johnson, Queer as Folk Star Hits the Road for Kerry, 365GAY.COM,

Oct. 19, 2004,

http://www.365gay.com/newscon04/10/101904qafElect.htm.
255 Deb Price, Elected Officials Put Human Face on Gay Issues,
DETROIT NEWS, June 7, 2004, at
7A.
2
Id.
257 See infra note 270 (describing law defining marriage
as between one man and one
woman).
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Gay voters support Democratic Party candidates by a three to one
margin.

At the statewide and local levels, especially in large urban areas,
gay voters are more highly concentrated. For example, gay voters
make up approximately nine percent of voters in large cities, seven
percent in smaller cities, and fewer in more rural areas. 59 This may
have an influence on gay rights advocates' ability to make gains in
terms of pro-gay legislation in areas in which gay voters are more
numerous. It would be difficult to argue that gay people lack access
to political channels in those states and municipalities in which they
are most centered. However, this is not necessarily true in more rural
areas or in certain regions of the country.26° And, despite the nearly
one million elected positions in the United States, only 275 elected
officials were openly gay in 2004.261

The above analysis shows that although a suspect class status argument can be made for gay people, some advances in gay rights
suggest that suspect status is less necessary than it was only two decades ago.
B. Limited JudicialIntervention in Benign Programs
Limited judicial intervention in state and municipal laws may
prove more desirable to gay rights proponents from a policy standpoint, because protections from discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity are not coming from federal statutes,
but rather from state and local governments. Heightened scrutiny of
these laws would threaten legislation protecting a majority of Americans from anti-gay discrimination in the absence of federal recognition of gay rights.
A majority of Americans are currently protected from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in private employment under
state and local legislation. Seventeen states and the District of Co-

258 See NATIONAL

GAY

AND

LESBIAN

TASK

FORCE,

DEMOGRAPHIC

VOTING

BLOCS

IN

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 2000 vs. 2004, available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
PresidentialDemographics2004.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) (demonstrating that seventy-seven
percent of gays, lesbians, or bisexuals voted for the Democratic Party presidential candidate in
2004 as compared with twenty-three percent voting for the Republican Party presidential candidate). Voters were not asked whether they identified as transgender in this poll. Id.
259 Johnson, supra note 254.
260 Gay rights protections are less prevalent in areas such as the southern United States and

less populated areas. See infra Part V.B for a discussion of state and local legislation.
261 Price, supra note 255, at 7A. For a complete and up-to-date list of gay elected officials, see
GAY & LESBIAN VICTORY FUND, OUT OFFICIALS, http://www.victoryfund.org/index.php?src=
directory&view=outelected (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
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lumbia 2 6 2 representing approximately forty-one percent of the
American population 2 have private employment nondiscrimination
laws. At least another fourteen percent of Americans are similarly
protected under county or municipal law.2 64 Another thirty-two states
and the District of Columbia have also passed hate crime laws that
explicily include anti-gay motivated crimes among covered hate

crimes.
On the other hand, the federal government does not provide any
of the protections offered by the above states. There is no federal
ban against private employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation,
nor are ant-gay crimes covered by the federal hate
crimes law. 67 And as of December 2005, the federal government continues to prohibit openly gay people from serving in the U.S. military.268
262 These include California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Eight of these states explicitly protect workers from private

discrimination on the basis of gender identity. NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, STATE
NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS IN THE U.S., Jan. 2006, available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/

downloads/nondiscriminationmap.pdf.

2 See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS
2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab04.txt (listing the populations of each state in
the United States).
264 See WAYNE VAN DER MEIDE, POLICY INSTITUTE OF THE NATIONAL
GAY AND LESBIAN TASK
FORCE, LEGISLATING EQUALITY: A REVIEW OF LAWS AFFECTING GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSCENDERED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES
11
(2000),
available at http://

www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/legeq99.pdf (analyzing the percentage of Americans covered
by county or city anti-discrimination laws in private employment as of 1999). The most recent
compilation lists these counties and cities as of 1999. Population changes after the 2000 Census
and the passage of additional protections since 1999 suggest that this number may be higher

today.
265 NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN
TASK FORCE, HATE CRIME LAWS IN
THE U.S., available at

httz//www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/hatecrimesmap.pdf (last visited March 3, 2006).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not include protections against employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (limiting
protection to discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"). The
proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) would add "sexual orientation" as a
prohibited basis for discrimination. See Human Rights Campaign, Summary: What Does ENDA
Do and Not Do, http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Background-Information&
CONTENTID=13309&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm
(last visited
Nov. 10, 2005) (describing the bill proposed in the 109th Congress).
27 See 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000) (providing no reference to sexual
orientation in the federal
hate crimes law). The proposed Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005,
which includes protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity, passed the U.S. House of Representatives on Sept. 14, 2005. See
Human Rights Campaign, Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act, http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=LocalLawEnforcementEnhancementAct&Template=/TaggedPage/
TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=23&ContentD=13493 (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (describing
the hate crimes legislation which passed the House by a 223-199 vote).
268 See Human Rights Campaign, Military Readiness Enhancement Act,
http://www.hrc.org/
Template.cfm?Section=MilitaryReadinessEnhancementAct&Template=/TaggedPage/
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Same-sex marriage rights have been overwhelmingly rejected by
state legislatures and voters in recent years. Many states responded to
Massachusetts' 2003 legalization of gay marriage by passing legislation
or placing referendums on the ballot to constitutionally prohibit
same-sex marriage.2

69

However, here too, the federal government has

proven equally, or even more unlikely, to intervene on behalf of
same-sex couples. Years before the recent onslaught of state-led initiatives aimed at prohibiting same-sex marriages, the federal government overwhelmingly passed the Defense of Marriage Act. It defined
marriage as a "union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife," and said that no state has to recognize a same-sex relationship "that is treated as a marriage. ,,270
Despite the rejection of same-sex marriage rights by numerous
states, five states (in addition to Vermont, whose civil union law preceded the Massachusetts decision) have adopted some form of statewide same-sex partnership rights since Massachusetts legalized gay
marriage. 27, Connecticut and Vermont currently allow same-sex civil

unions with all of the states' spousal rights2 7 2 California has domestic
partnerships for both gay and non-gay unmarried couples, providing
nearly all state-level spousal rights, and Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey provide some spousal rights to unmarried couples. 3
Therefore, even on an issue as divisive as same-sex marriage, in
which states have overwhelmingly rejected such a right, the fact that
seven states now recognize same-sex couples as having the same or
similar rights as opposite-sex couples suggests that state and local laws
are more likely to advance gay rights than federal legislation. Today,
as states and municipalities serve as the source of legislation to provide equal rights to gay people and to create programs to remedy
anti-gay discrimination, it is politically pragmatic for gay rights advocates to favor less judicial scrutiny of sexual orientation-related legis-

TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=23&ContentlD=27727 (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (describing
a proposed bill to repeal the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
M In 2004, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, and in 2005,
Kansas and Texas did as well. See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, ANTI-GAY MARRIAGE
MEASURES IN THE U.S., available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf

(last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (providing a map that shows which states have passed statutes or constitutional amendments outlawing gay marriage).
270 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1736C (2000)).
271

See HUMAN

RIGHTS

CAMPAIGN,

RELATIONSHIP

RECOGNITION

IN

THE

U.S.,

http://

www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Your_-Community&Template=/ContentManagement/
ContentDisplay.cfm&ContendD=16305 (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (displaying which states have
passed some form of same-sex partnership rights).
272 Id.
273

Id.
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lation rather than the heightened scrutiny which would be required if
gay people were recognized as a suspect class.
CONCLUSION

The Harvey Milk High School represents the first attempt by a city
to resolve the rampant physical, verbal, and emotional harassment
experienced by gay students through the establishment of a "safe"
school, limited to those students who cannot succeed in a community
school setting. Consideration of the Milk School's constitutionality
under the various tiers of judicial scrutiny suggests that rational basis
review may better serve the goals of gay rights advocates than would
the application of heightened scrutiny.
Today, more than ever before, states and municipal governments
are passing legislation and implementing programs such as the Milk
School to benefit gay people and remedy anti-gay bias. State and local statutes protect more than half of gay Americans from employment discrimination and hate-motivated crimes. Seven states also
have some form of same-sex partnership recognition. Because the
federal government does not provide similar rights, states and local
jurisdictions remain the sole source of legal protections for gay people.
Such advances raise doubts about the long-held belief that suspect
status recognition would best serve the goals of gay rights advocates.
One of the ironies of heightened scrutiny in the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence, as evidenced by the Court's rulings
on programs intended to benefit suspect classes, is that while recognition of a suspect class is certainly useful in battling malicious discrimination, it also has the potential to harm the suspect group at a
time when governmental bodies are beginning to pass legislation
meant to counter the effects of anti-gay bias. Benign programs meant
to remedy discrimination are far less likely to survive strict scrutiny
than rational basis review. The application of strict scrutiny does not
make it impossible for such legislation to withstand review, but it certainly makes it much more difficult as described in the case of an exclusively gay school.
This is not to suggest that the days of anti-gay legislation are gone
or that rational basis review would be preferable to strict scrutiny if
reviewing only malicious legislation. But, after Romer and Lawrence,
moral disapproval and the bare desire to harm gay people appear to
be insufficient justifications for legislation classifying on the basis of
sexual orientation. Because measures aimed at hurting gays will almost never be based on anything more than moral disapproval, such
measures should subsequently fail under Romer and Lawrence's rational basis analysis, making strict scrutiny less necessary to cure antigay bias than it was in the past.
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Although rational basis review is not the perfect solution to the
cause of remedying anti-gay bias in the United States, changing public opinion and governmental action in the area of gay rights suggests
that anti-gay statutes are giving way to more benign reforms in many
areas of legislative decision-making. Because benign legislation is
more likely to pass muster under rational basis review, perhaps the
benefits of suspect class recognition for gay people no longer outweigh the potential negative effects. Maybe rational basis scrutiny is
actually the more desirable method of judicial review for those seeking to protect programs such as the Harvey Milk High School.

